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Nationalism and Otherness
The representation of Islamic
fundamentalism in Egyptian cinema
Lina Khatib
Royal Holloway, University of London
abstract This article focuses on the representation of Islamic
fundamentalism in contemporary Egyptian films. It aims to go beyond
orientalism-based studies consumed with analysing the West’s representation
of, and thus power over, the East. The article problematizes discourses
examining fundamentalism’s role as the West’s Other and the source of its
identity by analysing the complicated political role that fundamentalism
plays in Egypt as an ‘Islamic’ democracy. Islamic fundamentalism is explored
as an Other in Egyptian cinema that is used as a tool for strengthening
Egyptian national identity. The article thus reveals the cultural tensions and
power struggles present within Egypt as a nation caught between modernity
and extremism. The article’s highlighting of the processes of Otherness
within the ‘East’ itself reveals the limitation of the idea of an East/West
dichotomy.
keywords Arab cinema, Edward Said, Egypt, film, Islam, Islamism,
national identity, orientalism 
Introduction: fundamentalism, representation and
myth1
The notion ‘Arab’ has become a synonym often for Islamic fundamental-
ism in contemporary culture, from films to social theory. The events of
September 11, 2001, the War on Iraq and the conflict in Palestine have
aided in linking Islamic fundamentalism with terrorism, and in turn posi-
tioning fundamentalism as an essential anti-western enemy. Islamic
fundamentalism has been perceived and represented in the context of
several myths based on an East/West binary. Perhaps most famously,
Islamic fundamentalism has been invoked by theorists such as Samuel
Huntington (1996) to indicate a clash between the cultures of the West
and those of the East. In this sense, Islamic fundamentalism has been
conflated often with Islam and the Middle East in general. This stance has
generated significant critiques of those perpetuating myths about Islam,
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fundamentalism and the Middle East. Most notably, Fred Halliday (1995)
has argued against the placing of Islam as a monolithic force poised against
the West. He has criticized the construction of the West itself as a homo-
geneous entity that is necessarily oppositional to a threatening Islam.
Halliday argues against stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs, pointing out
their contradiction: the Muslim/Arab Other is at once sensual and hedon-
istic, militant and passive.
One of the most fertile arenas for such myths is Hollywood. Surveying
Hollywood films over the last two-and-a-half decades, we find that several
films often engage in representing Arabs as ruthless, faceless Islamic
fundamentalist killers. Islamic fundamentalists are reduced to terrorists
and therefore dehumanized. There is often no distinction between the
notions ‘Arab’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic fundamentalist’. This mythical Other
is perceived usually as an ‘enemy’ in a battle of good versus evil, ‘us against
them’. Thus fundamentalism has been looked at as a symptom of the
Otherness of the Arab world, rather than as a ‘problem’ within it. The
other side of this construction is that of the United States as a nation. In
contrast to the degeneracy of the Arab/Muslim/fundamentalist Other, in
Hollywood the US stands superior, morally right and unbeatable.
There have been attempts at addressing this cinematic essentialism of
the Arab/Muslim world and its representation. The most well-known
work in this area is that of Jack Shaheen (1984, 1997, 2001), whose books
analyse the stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood as well as on
American television. Shaheen’s work is informed by a cultural imperial-
ism perspective – as expressed by numerous scholars such as Schiller
(1973), Smith (1987), Tomlinson (1991) and Tunstall (1977) – which
locates the relationship of the West to the East as one of dominance. More
recently, Sardar and Davies have referred to the representation of Muslims
in Hollywood and American television programmes to discuss the position
of the US as a ‘hyperpower’ (2003: vi) whose narratives export stereotypes
about Others worldwide but whose alternative cultural products are
submerged in this mainstream discourse.
Studies on the representation of Islam in western cinema have relied
often on Said’s (1978) discourse on orientalism as a theoretical basis. Said’s
discourse is useful for understanding the power relations between the
Orient and the Occident. Said looks at orientalism as a multifaceted
discourse characterized by four major ideas, which he calls ‘dogmas of
Orientalism’. First, there is an absolute and systematic difference between
the Orient (irrational, undeveloped, inferior) and the West (rational,
developed, superior). The West is not only defined as the diametrical
opposite of the East, but also as its protector and its carer. Second, abstrac-
tions about the Orient are preferable to direct evidence. Orientalism has
lumped the non-West into one large entity, disregarding the vast differ-
ences among non-western cultures in terms of religion, social structure and
values, thereby creating a fictional monolithic Orient. Third, the Orient is64
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eternal, uniform, incapable of defining itself, therefore a generalized
western vocabulary to describe the Orient is ‘scientifically objective’ (Said,
1978: 301). This is another way in which the West attempts to justify its
hegemony over the East. Finally, the Orient is something to be feared or
controlled. Said states that the relationship between the Orient and the
Occident is that of domination and hegemony and it ‘is hegemony . . . that
gives Orientalism . . . durability and strength’ (Said, 1978: 7).
While Said’s work on Orientalism is useful for analysing western
discourse on the East, one of its pitfalls is that denies the Orient’s capabil-
ity to represent itself and Others too. Halliday (1995) complements his
critique of ‘western’ myths about ‘Islam’ with one of the myths generated
by ‘Islam’ itself. Halliday argues that the Middle East is as much respon-
sible for perpetuating myths as the ‘West’ is. Halliday warns about the
existence of what he calls ‘Eastoxification’: ‘the uncritical reproduction of
myths about the region in the name of anti-imperialism’ (1995: 214). The
ability of the ‘East’ to produce discourse thus complicates Said’s position
on Orientalism, which he describes as being characterized by how ‘the . . .
[orientalist] writes about, whereas the [Oriental] is written about’ (Said,
1978: 308; emphasis in original). ‘Writing’ refers to how it is the West that
creates discourse about the East, not vice versa. Thus the Orient is
constructed as a silent Other, an object that is incapable of defining or
representing itself and therefore that is in need of western subjectivity. In
line with Halliday’s critique, this article aims to problematize Said’s views
on orientalism (and the massive body of work based on it) by presenting
the argument that when the Orient itself takes part in the process of
Othering, the Orient becomes more than ‘almost a European invention’
(Said, 1978: 1). Moreover, the article aims to highlight how the Orient’s
participation in Othering is a manifestation of the existence of power
struggles within the East, which are often overlooked in arguments
consumed by analysing the West’s outlook on the Orient.
To achieve this, the article analyses the representation of Islamic funda-
mentalism in Egyptian cinema, the biggest cinema industry in the Middle
East. Thus the article departs from familiar discourse on fundamentalism
and its representation – discourse based on western representations – into
analysing the position of fundamentalism in a cultural product or industry
outside of the West. The article argues that Islamic fundamentalism in this
cinema is used as a tool validating Egyptian national identity and agendas.
This can be seen through Egyptian films’ representation of Islamic funda-
mentalism as the Other. In this sense, the article aims at transcending
notions of an East/West binary by illustrating how fundamentalism is not
only an ‘enemy’ in the West, but also in the ‘East’. Moreover, fundamen-
talism is a tool for strengthening national identity in Egyptian cinema, not
just in Hollywood.
Benedict Anderson (1983) has stressed the centrality of the role of
communicative space in the process of nation formation. Hobsbawm 65
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(1990) adds to this argument that communication functions not only in the
creation of a nation, but also in maintaining it. In this sense, cinema can
be regarded as a space for the creation and maintenance of an Egyptian
imagined community whose members perceive themselves as a coherent
community with a secure shared identity and sense of belonging
(Anderson, 1983). Islamic fundamentalism is made to stand outside this
imagined community, at the same time consolidating its sense of belong-
ing by being a common threat. Islamic fundamentalism, then, is an
example of the tension between the cultural singularity invoked by
Egyptian nationalism and the reality that the Egyptian nation is in fact
plural and diverse (Hobsbawm, 1990). Egyptian cinema uses fundamen-
talism to validate the Egyptian national identity, an identity that assumes
the superiority of the inside over the outside, the familiar over the differ-
ent. As Balibar puts it, ‘the construction of identity is not an imaginary
process but a processing of the imaginary’ (1995: 187, emphasis in original).
And the ‘idea of nation is inseparable from its narration’ (Bennington,
1990: 132). Cinema, then, is an example of what Hobsbawm (1990) calls
‘invented traditions’: national myths and symbols that bind a nation
together, yet that are an official rather than a populist creation. This article
argues that Egyptian cinema only narrates the Egyptian government’s
story of the nation, where the rise of Islamic fundamentalism as an oppo-
sitional force has necessitated the validation of ‘a felt need for a rooted,
bounded, whole and authentic identity’ (Morley and Robins, 1990: 19). It
then highlights how Islamic fundamentalism is constructed as an artificial
entity vis-à-vis the ideological construction of the Egyptian nation as
natural. Thus, the representation of Islamic fundamentalism in this
cinema seems to follow the classical view of Otherness as telling us more
about ‘us’ than it does about ‘them’.
The article uses the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ to refer to ‘a diverse
set of competing political opinions held within the Muslim community’
(Ehteshami, 1997: 179). Despite the problematic nature of the term, its use
here emanates from the fact that other terms (Islamists, extremists,
fanatics, etc.) are no less damaging and also carry their own complications.
Thus the article uses ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in the political sense, to
refer to groups that use Islam as a basis to achieve political power.
Islamic fundamentalism in the Egyptian context
Ehteshami argues that during the post-colonial period, many Muslim
states have been faced with economic and social problems that have
required them to ‘withdraw from the public sphere and in doing so’ to
create ‘a political space that the Islamists have been quick to exploit and
occupy’ (1997: 188). The history of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt
stretches as far back as 1928, when the Muslim Brotherhood was estab-
lished. As well as aiming at moral, social and economic reform, the Muslim66
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Brotherhood aimed to eliminate the British (foreign) influence on Egypt
and ultimately to establish a Muslim polity. This stance resulted in various
clashes with the Egyptian government, with the Brotherhood’s declaration
of a jihad against foreign influence on Egypt in 1951 (Hiro, 1988) and its
attempt to assassinate President Nasser in 1954. Nasser eventually
executed the Brotherhood’s leader, Sayyid Qutb, in 1966.
The following year, Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt regarded the Six
Day War defeat as holy punishment; this defeat had drawn a mass of
Egyptians also towards fundamentalism for solace (Hammoud, 1998). This
resulted in a slight relaxation of government control over fundamentalists,
culminating with Anwar Sadat’s institutionalization of Islam as a source
of legislation in 1971 after allowing fundamentalists to operate freely and
publicly. However, this did not prevent the Islamic Liberation Group from
trying to overthrow Sadat’s regime in 1974. Consequently, Sadat refused to
recognize any fundamentalist groups as political parties in the parlia-
mentary poll in 1976. The Camp David Accords two years later catalysed
further anti-Sadat sentiment (Ayubi, 1982) and Sadat’s signing of a treaty
with Israel in 1979 led to his assassination by another fundamentalist
group, Tanzim al-Jihad, in 1981. President Mubarak continued with
governmental non-recognition of the right of Islamic fundamentalist
groups to political representation, which led to fundamentalist groups
operating independently of the government in the 1990s. After an attack
by fundamentalists on Coptic Christians in Asyut in 1992, Mubarak intro-
duced the death penalty for membership of terrorist organizations. The
bombing of the World Trade Center by supporters of the Egyptian sheikh,
Omar Abdul Rahman, the following year led to Mubarak’s labelling of
fundamentalists as international terrorists (Faksh, 1997). The same year
saw the release of the first Egyptian film representing Islamic fundamen-
talists, Terrorism and Barbecue (Sherif Arafa, 1993). Since 1993, the
Egyptian government has used cinema as a tool for combating the spread
of Islamic fundamentalism; seven Egyptian popular feature films have
been produced that address the ‘problem’ of Islamic fundamentalism in
Egypt, which are discussed in this article.
Islamic fundamentalism in Egyptian cinema:
the Other within
If we are to accept that the nation is a construct of ‘pastness’ (Wallerstein,
1991), then the complication in the portrayal of Egypt in film is that it
seems to advocate a selective memory of the nation’s past. Egypt is unique
in the Arab world because, perhaps more than other Arab countries, it has
a complex identity. It combines Asian with African, Muslim with
Pharaohnic and Arab (Abdullah, 2000). None of those identities can be
seen as the ‘true’ identity of Egypt, yet Egyptian nationalism is built upon
a mixture of all of these identities, although in different proportions. Thus 67
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while Islam may be considered by the majority of Egyptians to be their
primary identification, the official discourse on Islam has tended to ignore
the contribution of Islamic fundamentalist groups to the ‘invention’ of the
Egyptian nation (rallying against the British in the 1920s) and, more
generally, to marginalize the role of religion in Egyptian national identity.
Balibar argues that when national identity begins to integrate religious
identity, it ends up replacing it, forcing it to become ‘nationalized’ (1991:
95). This is because there is a conflict between nation and religion over the
same principles that cement a religious community and a national one (for
example, love, respect, sacrifice, fear). Balibar argues that national
ideology transfers those principles from religious affiliation onto its ‘ideal
signifiers’ (1991: 95) (such as the name of the nation; thus ‘Egypt’ would
replace ‘Islam’). Therefore it is understandable that a feeling of malaise
may be generated among those minorities who still consider their only
affiliation to be religion.
The analysis of the representation of fundamentalism in Egyptian
cinema illustrates this tension in Egyptian national politics, where Egypt
is caught between being moderately Islamic and fighting against a sub-
versive and strong political force that is fundamentalism. Egypt as an
official entity sees Islam as ‘good’, but so does it see other religions; it does
not necessarily argue for East/West harmony but it calls for the appropri-
ation of ‘good’ elements from the West. It supports modernity and
condemns extremism while remaining in the realm of tradition.
Smith (1991) points out that usually nations are not invented (i.e. they
do not just ‘happen’ ahistorically), but are a matter of reconstructing
existing and arriving ethnic and religious groups. These factors complicate
the existence of a modern Egyptian nation, pointing out the need to inte-
grate minorities into the core. However, the films seem to prefer a selec-
tive integration, celebrating the nationalism of the Copts while portraying
Islamic fundamentalists as intolerant of people from other religions.
Although nationalist, Egypt’s regime is not entirely secular, as it relies on
Islam as one source of jurisdiction despite its large non-Muslim minority
(Al-Ahsan, 1992). This use of Islam is an ‘attempt to use traditional regu-
lations as markers of communal identity and not as part of a broader
program for instruments for the totalistic reconstruction of society’
(Eisenstadt, 1999: 151). Eisenstadt sees this as one of the reasons behind
the clashes between Islamic fundamentalists and the government. This is
expressed in The Terrorist (Nader Galal, 1994), where the Islamic funda-
mentalist Ali’s dream is to establish a purely fundamentalist state exclud-
ing any Christians or non-fundamentalist Muslim ‘infidels’. The Terrorist
puts this point across in a conversation between Ali and the Christian,
Hani. Not knowing Hani’s religion, Ali expresses his utopian views. When
Ali later finds out that Hani is a Christian, he is shown to be shocked as
he had always perceived Hani as a ‘good’ person. The film tries to decon-
struct the fundamentalist ideal world and even collapse it. It focuses on68
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how the fundamentalists themselves construct ‘boundaries between the
“pure” inside and the “polluted” outside, as well as their self-perception
as the “elect”’; this is described by Eisenstadt as ‘utopian sectarianism’
(1999: 90). In this light, the fundamentalist identity can be seen as intol-
erant towards those who are different and thus fundamentalists are repre-
sented as a threat to national unity.
West argues that the propagation of essentialist notions of ‘homoge-
neous national communities’ and ‘positive images’ (1995: 161) is a means
by which the authoritarian élite repress their heterogeneous populations.
Thus nationalism, as advocated in the Egyptian films, is a form of
hegemony. Balibar (1995) sees this hegemony as creating a conflict for the
‘non-national’, forcing them to make a choice between their competing
belongings, thereby implying that those belongings cannot coexist. Balibar
(1991) also argues that nationalism is an ideology built upon the symbolic
difference between ourselves and foreigners, be they inside or outside.
However, the concept of ‘nation’ as such is problematic, for it threatens to
erase the pasts of those within it, forcing them to cling on to those pasts.
By acting as a vehicle to strengthen national identity (alongside other
vehicles such as ethnicity, language and religion), the films add to that
threat by naturalizing the nation that they represent – in other words, by
essentializing it.
The portrayal of fundamentalism in the films is in line with the way
that Islamic fundamentalism is viewed by the Egyptian government as a
threat to nationalism and democracy. For example, one film explicitly
portrays the Egyptian government jailing Islamic fundamentalists; Nasser:
The Story of a Man, a Story of a Nation (Anwar Kawadri, 1998) depicts the
way in which President Nasser imprisoned his Islamic fundamentalist
opponents in the 1950s after they conspired against him. The way that
fundamentalists are treated at present is also represented in one of the
films, Birds of Darkness (Sherif Arafa, 1995), which depicts the govern-
ment’s arrest and imprisonment of an Islamic fundamentalist political
activist. In such films, fundamentalists are contrasted with the image of
the government, which is portrayed as being ‘good’. However, this does not
negate the existence of government criticism; Terrorism and Barbecue
criticizes the malfunctioning of government services. But at the same time
the film subtly blames Islamic fundamentalists for this malfunctioning
through the depiction of an Islamic fundamentalist civil servant, Rashad,
who spends his day at the office praying instead of working. The represen-
tation of Islamic fundamentalists in Egyptian cinema can be analysed
along the lines of several themes that have emerged from the films. These
can be summarized as depicting both the internal (psychological distress,
sexual repression) and external (corruption, terrorism) characteristics of
the fundamentalist.
69
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Fundamentalism as artifice: moral and political corruption
One way in which fundamentalists are portrayed is as corrupt and hypo-
critical. This hypocrisy can be seen on several levels. First, fundamental-
ists are portrayed as hypocritical in relation to the West. Hello America
(Nader Galal, 2000) is a film that opposes American ideology by demoniz-
ing the US as a land of crime and immorality. The film represents the
experience of a naive Egyptian man, Bikhit, who is lured out of Egypt by
the chance to work in the US. However, his experiences in the US are so
negative that he decides to go back home for good. For not only does Bikhit
experience discrimination and witness racism, he also becomes involved in
an incident illustrating America’s indifference towards the Middle East.
Bikhit gets a chance in the film to meet the American president and
decides to utilize that opportunity to make him aware of the Palestine
question. But the encounter turns out to be no more than a photo oppor-
tunity highlighting the president’s ‘interest’ in and ‘care’ for the region.
This leaves Bikhit in the hands of Egyptian Islamic fundamentalists
residing comfortably in the US, who are quick to exploit every occurrence
of political indifference in order to attract the Arab masses with statements
such as ‘America is the great Satan, it lies to its people’. The film then high-
lights America’s corruption but surpasses it by showing that, while the
fundamentalists overtly voice their opposition to this corruption, they
covertly enjoy the economic and political benefits of this so-called enemy.
This hypocrisy is seen also in The Other (Youssef Chahine, 1999). The
film revolves around a young Egyptian journalist, Hanan, who falls in love
with a half-Egyptian, half-American man, Adam. Adam’s mother,
Margaret, is an American businesswoman who detests Egypt, yet is
engaged in fraudulent business plans that would allow her economic
control over the country. She is also obsessed with her son, to whom she
turns to provide her with the love and attention that she lacks in her
marriage. She opposes his marriage to Hanan and forms an unholy alliance
with Hanan’s brother, the Islamic fundamentalist Fat’hallah, who also
opposes the relationship and promises Margaret to force the couple to
divorce. Similarly, Fat’hallah’s goal is to control Egypt through the estab-
lishment of an Islamic fundamentalist regime. Fat’hallah and Margaret
are revealed to be partners, using the internet to communicate and conduct
their personal deals as well as illegal arms and immigration deals. This
contrasts with Fat’hallah the fundamentalist’s preaching against the West.
Second, fundamentalists are shown to be hypocrites in the context of
charity and morality. While they emphasize family values, The Other sees
Fat’hallah setting a trap for his sister in order to separate her from her
husband and ‘sell’ her to one of his friends. While the fundamentalists
supposedly collect money from people for charity, we see them using this
money to pay for their personal lawsuits in Birds of Darkness (Sherif Arafa,
1995), a film depicting Islamic fundamentalist spin-doctoring during the
Egyptian parliamentary elections. The film shows the fundamentalists70
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using zakat (Muslim charity) money for the bail of a fundamentalist
convicted of corruption. While the fundamentalists preach morals and
values, they steal money in The Terrorist. Ali, a fundamentalist terrorist
hosted by a secular family after being run over by the daughter’s car, raids
the father’s office with the justification that the father is an ‘infidel’ and
takes a sum of money which the father – a medical doctor – had been
saving to build a hospital in a needy village.
Third, fundamentalism is portrayed as being hypocritical in its partici-
pation in national politics (parliamentary elections). In Birds of Darkness,
since the Islamic fundamentalists cannot run for parliamentary elections
themselves, they back certain ‘secular’ candidates and exchange favours.
The fundamentalist lawyer Ali supports the secular politician Rushdie
Khayyal in his campaign and Khayyal wins only after this support. The
film shows how Khayyal indulges in parties and women and marries his
mistress in order to ‘appear’ moral in front of his fundamentalist support-
ers. Moreover, fundamentalists in this political context are both confused
and manipulative. Several scenes in Birds of Darkness play on these
themes. The film is critical of the government. When the secular lawyer
Fat’hi is talking to his fundamentalist colleague Ali, he tells him: ‘The
government is smart. It has left you mosques. Lets you publish books. Hold
interviews. All this to prove it is democratic.’ However, the film begins with
a disclaimer that it is entirely fiction. This self-censorship is linked with
Egypt’s reliance on a 30-year-long emergency law that allows the presi-
dent to censor any form of expression prior to publication in the interest
of ‘national security’ and also for arousing religious sensitivities (‘Silence
in the Nile’, 1998).
The major fundamentalist figure in the film is the lawyer, Ali. The film
mentions how Ali once tried to sue the Minister of Culture for allowing
‘immoral’ film posters to be displayed in the streets. Fat’hi, the liberal
lawyer, explains how Ali’s stunt is merely to advertise the Muslim Brothers.
Ali’s character is smart, manipulative and calculating, in contrast to the
fundamentalist majority in the film who are portrayed as stupid and
having no will of their own. Fat’hi arrives at a fundamentalist gathering,
walking inbetween two rows of bearded men dressed in white skullcaps
and white gallabiyyas. He repeats, ‘May God separate you’, to which they
respond ‘Amen’, parrot fashion, unable to tell right from wrong. The film
thus demarcates two kinds of fundamentalists who are nevertheless
equally condemned: ‘true’ fundamentalists, mere blind followers who
cannot tell right from wrong; and ‘fake’ fundamentalists, who are in charge
but there merely for economic and political power.
Those in charge are portrayed as putting on an act and not genuinely
believing or practising what they overtly do. When Fat’hi first talks to Ali
in the film, Ali speaks to him in classical Arabic. Fat’hi tells him to save
that for lawsuits, after which Ali speaks in colloquial Arabic. When Fat’hi’s
client, Samira, a prostitute found innocent after Ali defends her case (a 71
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favour done for Fat’hi, who chose Ali for the defence because the judge is
pro-fundamentalist), tries to kiss Ali on the cheek and offers him food to
thank him, he quickly responds with ‘I take refuge in God’ and refusing
to eat ‘haram’ food. Fat’hi reminds him that she is innocent in the eyes of
the law, implying that Ali has put his ‘beliefs’ on hold in his defence of
Samira. We later find out that Ali turned to fundamentalism after being
a communist because he realized the former would make him more money.
Thus, the world of fundamentalism is one of deceit and contradiction.
Although they might be based on Egypt’s experience of fundamentalists,
the Egyptian films tend to make claims about them that essentialize their
identity as an extreme Other. At the same time, the films essentialize the
identity of Egypt as a homogeneous, anti-fundamentalist monolith. This
raises the question of whose experience of fundamentalism is being
depicted. The exclusionary stance that the films adopt suggests that the
Egypt we see is the one constructed by the Egyptian government. Thus,
despite the existence of government criticism, in the end the films, as in
Terrorism and Barbecue, present the government’s ‘national story’.
Psychologizing fundamentalism: internal and external
oppression
Islamic fundamentalism is portrayed as one way of dealing with personal
psychological crisis. The Other reveals how Fat’hi – who is now the funda-
mentalist Sheikh Fat’hallah – had slept with his sister while they were
teenagers and how fundamentalism was the only way in which he could
cope with his guilt (she, on the other hand, seems unfazed). The film thus
psychologizes fundamentalism as a kind of post-traumatic stress disorder.
At the same time, it tends to portray fundamentalism as an unreasonable
way of dealing with crisis. Fundamentalism is represented not as some-
thing emanating from the nature of the primitive Other, i.e. as a situation
that one is born into, but as a state of ‘becoming’.
This state of becoming can be seen in cases where the Egyptian films
represent fundamentalists as terrorists. Terrorism in the films is linked
with how the fundamentalists themselves are repressed and thus find
refuge in killing. In contrast with the lawyer Ali in Birds of Darkness, who
has clear political interests, the terrorists in The Other and The Terrorist
have no definite political cause and act on mere personal interest. In The
Other the fundamentalists are anarchists who do not hesitate to shoot at
the Egyptian army or plant bombs in Cairo, killing innocent people. The
Terrorist goes deeper into portraying the psychological aspects of the
Islamic fundamentalist terrorist’s life. The film shows how the fundamen-
talist’s desire oscillates between being forbidden and being permissible.
In The Terrorist, the fundamentalist Ali is a man with sexual desires,
just like everybody else. Ali’s character is portrayed as being driven by his
fantasies as opposed to his rational mind, and as being highly compliant72
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to his leader, Ahmad. Ahmad uses Ali’s fantasies to lure him into conduct-
ing a terrorist act. Ahmad guarantees Ali a wife if he assassinates an anti-
fundamentalist liberal government official, a promise that does not
materialize. Ali is also convinced by his leader that the ‘possession’ of the
women of ‘infidels’ is permissible. After Ali is run over by a woman whose
non-fundamentalist Muslim family welcomes him into their home while
he recovers, he does not hesitate to follow his leader’s suggestion and makes
a sexual move on the woman’s sister, which she blatantly rejects.
Ali is torn between his religious commitment and his voyeurism. In one
scene Ali walks down the street behind a woman wearing a tight dress.
The camera displays Ali gazing at her bottom, which the camera then
zooms in on, giving us Ali’s perspective. The camera traces Ali’s footsteps
into his dark, barren apartment where he sits on a chest full of grenades
reading a book about ‘the torture and bliss of the grave’. Ali tries his best
to cut himself off from worldly pleasures, but finds himself fantasizing
about his sexy neighbour who he can hear singing and laughing. Ali peeps
from his window at the woman, who wears a low-cut red dress and is on
a lower floor in the building opposite him. Ali fantasizes about having sex
with the woman – something that disturbs him and drives him to seek
refuge in vigorous exercise and prayer.
A similar situation can be found in Terrorism and Barbecue. The film
revolves around the story of an ordinary man, Ahmad, who goes to a
government building for a normal bureaucratic transaction (to transfer his
children to a school nearer their home), and in a comedy of errors finds
himself involved in an armed anti-governmental protest. Two of the
people who also find themselves involved in the protest by chance are a
nameless call girl, who was present in the building because she was being
questioned by the police on prostitution charges, and an Islamic funda-
mentalist civil servant, Rashad. The call girl plays a key role in the film,
in that she is used to point out Rashad’s moral dissolution. With eyes
almost popping out at the call girl’s breasts, Rashad ‘advises’ her to ‘go back
to the right path’, saying ‘all you need is a long dress and a veil and you
will be virtuous’. The veil becomes the passport that will legitimize the
fundamentalist’s action on his desire. This desire remains forbidden other-
wise and all the man can do is stare, causing the call girl to wonder, ‘Is this
look on your face that of an adviser? And how come you are not advising
the rest of the people?’
Islamic fundamentalism is also portrayed as a threat to basic freedoms,
such as freedom of expression and religion. The opening sequences of two
films illustrate this case. The Terrorist begins with fundamentalists
destroying and burning the contents of a video shop. Destiny (Youssef
Chahine, 1997), an historical epic about the life of the 12th-century
Andalusian philosopher Averroes, also begins with the image of a man
being tortured then burned at the stake, condemned a heretic for trans-
lating the work of Averroes. Averroes was known for his religious tolerance 73
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and for interpreting the Koran philosophically. The film then moves to
directly accusing Islamic fundamentalists of the torture and later portrays
them burning Averroes’ books. The Terrorist’s burning of the video shop
and Destiny’s burning of Averroes’ books remind us of the Egyptian funda-
mentalists’ success in banning some of the Egyptian writer and Nobel
Prizewinner Naguib Mahfouz’s books – in particular, Awlad Haritna
(Children of our Neighbourhood) (Moussalli, 1998). The book had been
banned under Nasser’s regime in 1959 for its allegorical suggestion that
God is dead (Allen, 1994), while other works continue to be banned for
themes considered offensive to the religious authorities. Islamic funda-
mentalists attacked Naguib Mahfouz and stabbed him in the neck in 1994
after Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman, leader of the Islamic group al-Gama’a
al-Islamiyya, issued a fatwa excommunicating him (‘Silence in the Nile’,
1998). Destiny allegorically portrays the fundamentalists killing the singer
Marwan and their success in converting the caliph’s son Abdullah to funda-
mentalism and away from the scenes of song and dance. The film’s director
Youssef Chahine has used Averroes as a portrayal of himself, as Chahine
was attacked by fundamentalists after they accused his earlier film The
Emigrant (1994) of being blasphemous. Chahine’s message against the
oppression of free expression exerted by fundamentalists is made even
blunter in a sentence that appears on the screen just after the film ends:
‘Ideas have wings, no one can stop their flight’ (Privett, 2004).
Essentializing fundamentalism: fundamentalism and Egyptian
nationalism
The films establish the Egyptian nation as a norm through representing
non-fundamentalist ordinary people engaging in various daily activities,
from going to work to fighting with their spouses, while at the same time
enjoying the pleasures of life such as music and alcohol. This norm is then
contrasted with the lives of fundamentalists. We do see the fundamental-
ists performing everyday activities, but even those activities tend to be
‘different’. While the ‘normal’ Egyptian man has dinner with his wife and
children (Terrorism and Barbecue), the fundamentalist man eats dinner
with his four wives, with whom he communicates in a way that he would
with animals, not speaking to them but shouting and gesturing at them
(The Terrorist). While the ‘normal’ Egyptian woman is free to pursue any
career she chooses (as long it is ‘moral’), her fundamentalist sister is
confined to working as a secretary or a messenger (The Terrorist, Birds of
Darkness). In other words, while the modern Egyptian woman is portrayed
as being active in her choices, the fundamentalist woman is confined to
executing orders made by her male superiors. The use of women here falls
into the general view of women as symbols of the nation and the gauge
that measures the nation’s morality and modernity. By portraying
Egyptian women as modern and independent (and not silent – the way74
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that Islamic fundamentalist women are portrayed) yet respectful of values,
the message sent by the films is that about the Egyptian identity being as
such. Islamic fundamentalists are used as tools to emphasize this moderate,
non-corrupt identity.
This parallels Shapiro’s view of films as ‘identity stories’ which form
‘the basis for a nation’s coherence’ (1989: 47). Shapiro argues that by
nature, identity stories must create a boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and
‘impose a model of identity/difference’ (1989: 48). In other words this
formulation, with its insistence on margins against centres, constructs
difference as a prior condition of identity (Bennington, 1990). A compli-
cation of the above model occurs when the Other shares some of the
characteristics of ‘us’. In the case of Egyptian fundamentalists, the fact that
they are Egyptian and Muslim living in the same society as the Egyptian
‘us’ perplexes their projected difference. Nationalism implies the existence
of a social unit that governs itself; however, it is difficult to define this social
unit, who is included within it and who is not (Birch, 1989). This is why
national integration is a complex concept, namely when nations contain
ethnic or other minorities. In this case, there is a danger that national inte-
gration can become a form of totalitarianism, which takes us to the point
that, what with potential conflicts in the name of national integration,
nationalism is in the end an ideal (Kedourie, 1961). Kedourie cites the
Middle East as an example of an area where minorities were oppressed by
their governments during the post-imperialist period even more than they
were under the Ottoman Empire or British mandate. As he puts it, ‘nation-
alism and liberalism, far from being twins, are really antagonistic prin-
ciples’ (Kedourie, 1961: 109).
Thus the films continue to try to demark the two sides, the ‘national’
and the ‘fundamentalist’. This is represented linguistically, with the funda-
mentalists’ communication portrayed as alien. Not only do fundamental-
ists speak in classical as opposed to colloquial Arabic, they also have their
own system of greetings (involving mutual shoulder kissing) and their own
greeting phrases (elaborate ‘Islamic’ greetings). They have a distinct mode
of dress (long, white gallabiyyas and white skullcaps) and a distinct
appearance (with all the men growing beards) (Terrorism and Barbecue,
The Terrorist, Destiny, The Other). The only way in which this appearance
is altered to look like ‘ours’ is when the fundamentalists want to blend into
society in order to execute either a terrorist attack or achieve a political
aim. The fundamentalist lawyer Ali in Birds of Darkness is bearded but
wears a suit, which serves to add to his credibility in his political campaign;
the terrorist Ali in The Terrorist goes further by shedding his beard and
dress (much to his dismay) in order to disappear into society to assassinate
an anti-fundamentalist government official.
The films’ attempt at showing that the fundamentalists are utterly
different recalls Shapiro’s argument that ‘the claim to distinctiveness has
required an energetic denial of otherness within’ (1989: 54). This denial is 75
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part of the effort to preserve a national identity that simply does not recog-
nize the fundamentalist’s right to be represented. Still, the representation
of Islamic fundamentalists in Egyptian cinema – from an Egyptian nation-
alist point of view – remains heavily reliant on ‘metaphors’ which attempt
to ‘fix’ Egyptian culture as essentially anti-fundamentalist, thereby
denying the dynamic nature of culture itself (Shapiro, 1999; Tehranian,
2000). Shapiro (1999: 112) argues that this ‘alleged cultural unity’ is one
way in which the modern state seeks legitimacy.
Conclusion
Egyptian cinema uses familiar, ‘sensationalist stereotypes’ that are ‘meant
to . . . reinforce a myopic vision of reality’ (Esposito, 1999: 220) about
Islamic fundamentalists. This ‘set of visual signifiers’ (Karim, 2000: 68)
includes beards, white skullcaps and gallabiyyas and chador-wearing
women. The way in which Islamic fundamentalists are depicted as
dressing, then, serves in particular to portray them ‘as “medieval” in life-
style and mentality’ (Esposito, 1999: 220) in contrast to the civilized ‘us’.
This constructs fundamentalism as being essentially anti-modern
(O’Hagan, 2000) in contrast with the films’ portrayal of the Egyptian
nation as progressive and modern. This is interesting when one considers
that, in addition to their reliance on traditional symbols, fundamentalists
utilize modern weapons (computers, guns, etc.) in their supposed fight
against modernism (Agha, 2000).
Thus, Egyptian cinema seems to rely on clichés in its representations of
‘us’ and ‘them’. In this sense this cinema can be said to be colonial towards
Islamic fundamentalists, constructing the colonized (the fundamentalist)
as a degenerate Other in order to justify Egypt’s conquest of this figure. In
its construction of the fundamentalist as Other, Egyptian cinema seems to
project the fundamentalist image as ‘a fixed reality which is at once an
“other” and yet entirely knowable and visible’ (Bhabha, 1983: 21). This
Other is treated using a variety of techniques. One is the reliance on the
‘myth of historical origination – racial purity, cultural priority’ (Bhabha,
1983: 26). Egyptian cinema presents the fundamentalists as alien and
inferior to Egyptian culture, which in turn is imagined as being pure and
uniform. The films also rely on the ideas of lack and difference in their
portrayal of fundamentalists, the latter lacking ‘our’ morals and being
essentially different from ‘us’. At the same time, the cinema’s representa-
tions of fundamentalists are paradoxical: the fundamentalist is ‘mystical,
primitive, simple-minded and yet the most worldly and accomplished liar
and manipulator’ (Bhabha, 1983: 34).
In this sense, Egyptian cinema’s portrayal of fundamentalists seems to
parallel that of Hollywood. But the representation of Islamic fundamen-
talism in each cinema suggests the difficulty of establishing any concept
of a global identity. Although the two cinemas and the two nations (the76
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US and Egypt) converge in their Othering of Islamic fundamentalists, in
doing so they nevertheless resort to different, sometimes clashing, national
experiences. This not only applies to the construction of Others, but also
to the juxtaposition of Others with the national self. While each side strives
to strengthen its national identity, each refers to separate and exclusive
memories and collective pasts. Thus we can see that, despite the existence
of a ‘global’ enemy, the nation is not dead. In fact, the existence of this
enemy has strengthened the plurality of national identity in a global world
(Smith, 1991). At the same time, seeing fundamentalism as an enemy
suggests the limits in pluralism within the nation (Mouffe, 1995).
Moreover, we can see that the confrontation between Islamic fundamen-
talism and nationalism stresses how the former is a global force while the
latter, although a global phenomenon, is localized. Of course, even a global
product such as fundamentalism is localized when given interpretations
that are different from those employed by the producers, hence the need
to look at fundamentalism in an historical context. In this sense, Islamic
fundamentalism as seen in the films is contradictory: it is both about
emergent and disappearing peripheries, hegemonization and fragmenta-
tion, expansion and contraction (Friedman, 1994).
Having spoken about Islamic fundamentalists as defiled subalterns does
not imply the necessity of reversing their status into a sanctified one. There
is an equal danger in doing so; Chow argues that such a practice belongs
to the same symbolic order as representing subalterns as defiled, in that it
implies our own ‘self-deception as the non-duped’ (1994: 146), a desire on
our part to seize control. Only when the subaltern speaks can this situation
change. But, as Spivak says, ‘If the subaltern can speak then, thank God,
the subaltern is not a subaltern any more’ (1990: 158).
Both Egyptian cinema and Hollywood use their Others to strengthen
their respective national identities. In her analysis of the extremism of
Pauline Hansen – the independent Australian MP for Oxley who is
infamous for propagating a white, homogenous Australian identity – Ang
warns that danger lies in any argument which is too essentializing. For
Ang,
the national . . . is not to be defined in terms of ‘identity’ at all, but as a prob-
lematic process; the national is to be defined not in terms of the formulation
of a positive, ‘common culture’ or ‘cohesive community’ but as the unending,
day-to-day hard work of managing and negotiating differences. (2000: 9)
This is the climatic link between Hollywood and the Egyptian films. In
their strong national parades, both tend to construct communities devoid
of Others. This is where the two sides end up telling different versions of
the same subjective ‘truth’ and where both East and West do not seem to
be divided that much after all. Thus, the East tries to exclude a part of
itself as an Other, while the West excludes it. 77
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Note
1. A version of this article will appear in my forthcoming book Filming the
Modern Middle East: Politics in the Cinemas of Hollywood and the Arab
World (I.B. Tauris, 2006).
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